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Abstract 
Aerospace is in the midst of a renaissance, expanding on both the air and space side into major 
new commercial areas including unmanned air systems (UAS), on demand mobility (ODM), 
personal air vehicles (PAV), and commercial deep space. These new areas require, in the initial 
planning, consideration of new safety, reliability, and in some cases, enabling performance 
approaches for viability. For example, due to their huge numbers, if current accident rates 
prevail, UAS/ODM/PAV aircraft could crash at an unacceptable rate, causing life and property 
damage. Also, if humans in commercial space activities have serious health issues and/or there 
are unacceptable rocket viability issues/crash rates, these new, major markets (order of $1T/yr.) 
could be rapidly curtailed until agreeable and effective changes are instituted, producing 
additional expense, delay, and reduced revenue. This report addresses such safety and 
reliability issues and includes: performance enhancement possibilities such as an enabling Air 
Traffic Control System (ATC), crash proof vehicles, increased range for aero, space debris 
removal, and human health for space.  
 
Introduction 
The major aerospace metrics are cost, safety/reliability, and performance. Reliability analysis 
can be defined as the study of why, how, and when things fail. Safety is what happens when 
they do fail. Conventionally, reliability involves serious testing and operational experiences and 
statistics derived therefrom. This approach, as applied to civilian airliners, resulted in a 
magnificent reliability and safety record. 
 
There are two emerging, and potentially massive, aerospace markets that were initiated largely 
based upon developing cost enablers/drivers and both of these appear to require greatly 
enhanced reliability/safety and performance enhancements/enablements. The first of these 
markets is the development and application of UAS/ODM/PAV, which is rapidly evolving. The 
second is commercial deep space, which is enabled by advancing technologies and space 
access cost reductions provided by reusable rockets. 
 
UAS/ODM/PAV involve small, mainly vertical take-off and landing (VTOL), increasingly 
autonomous electric aircraft for a plethora of national security, service, commercial, and 
personal applications (Ref. 1). A major requirement for safety and reliability includes greatly 
decreased crash/hull loss rates as compared to extant commercial aircraft, which are already 
inordinately safe. This keeps the number of crashes low enough to be acceptable with the 
projected orders of magnitude more aircraft in the air. There are some 39,000 aircraft now and 
estimates for future UAS/ODM/PAV numbers are in the tens of millions or greater. The ultimate 
market is a fly/drive replacement for the automobile. The worldwide market for this new aero 
industry segment is projected to reach the order of one trillion dollars per year going forward. 
Additional requirements for UAS/ODM/PAV safety include: an air traffic control (ATC) system 
capable of handling millions versus thousands of aircraft, and operational/safety certification. 
Performance metrics include longer range for a given battery energy density. 
    
All aspects of this emerging market are being invented and developed in real time. There are a 
hundred plus vehicle designs being researched by tens of companies. This ongoing UAS R&D 
is rapid, very competitive, explores technologies with new capabilities, and has application trade 
spaces with cost as a major metric. As such, it is termed by some as the “wild west” of 
aeronautics. Thus far the safety considerations mentioned above are not as well developed as 
will probably be necessary. The overall crash rate requirement is made more worrisome by the 
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fact that these air vehicles will spend much of their time over populated areas, versus 
commercial aircraft that fly over sparsely populated and water covered regions much of the 
time. For a given crash, there is therefore a greater chance of property and personal damage. 
However, there is usually less total overall impact per incident due to the smaller size of these 
vehicles, depending on what they impact.  
 
For performance with electric propulsion, what is desired is range equivalent to that using heavy 
transportation chemical fuels.  The market size for these vehicles is often proportional to 
achievable range. The term range is used either directly or to service multiple stops before 
having to recharge the vehicle. Range is a function of vehicle drag and weight for a given 
propulsion system. Additional performance metrics for these vehicles include acoustics and 
VTOL capability. 
 
Another emerging aerospace market that requires improved reliability, safety, and performance 
for viability is commercial deep space, commercial space beyond geosynchronous orbit (GEO) 
(Ref. 2). Current commercial space is a successful and major business area that operates at 
GEO and below. This largely includes positional Earth utilities such as telecom, internet, 
navigation, weather forecasting, imagery, resource monitoring. Commercial deep space is 
nascent but investment and interest is growing rapidly. This is bolstered by the recent NASA 
shift to the moon before Mars, the discovery of water on the moon, and tech developments 
enabling cost reductions. Much of the current deep space commercial attention is focused on 
mining the moon, asteroids, and Mars for water, minerals, etc. The increasing capability of 
autonomous robotics and artificial intelligence (AI) enables a cost picture for such mining that is 
far more favorable than if humans were involved on-site in space. Estimates for human space 
presence are usually a factor of 500 or greater cost. There are not only increased costs 
associated with placing humans on-site, but also serious health and safety/reliability issues 
associated with the space environment (e.g. galactic cosmic rays (GCR), micro g or partial g, 
psychological challenges, equipage reliability, vacuum pressure, extreme temperatures, etc.) 
(Ref. 3).  
     
The use of reusable rockets, systems, and equipage will greatly reduce overall costs and 
thereby increase business possibilities in deep space. However, the historical rocket loss rate of 
1%or greater, i.e. on the order of one or more every 100 launches, robust over many decades 
now, may not be suitable for commercial activities, especially those with humans on board.  
 
With an increasing number of satellites in Earth’s orbit and thousands planned to launch in the 
near future, increased space debris is another safety issue that requires attention for viable 
deep space commercial activities (Ref. 4). Also, space tourism is a business activity that could 
be viable in deep space so long as the safety of space access and the health issues previously 
mentioned, are addressed.  
 
Aerospace is experiencing a renaissance. It is booming and expanding in both the air and space 
domains into new commercial areas. These new areas require consideration of stringent safety, 
reliability, and performance issues for viability. If too many UAS/ODM/PAV aircraft crash and 
cause life and property damage, if humans during commercial space activities have adverse 
health effects or mortal impacts, or if rocket loss rates are unacceptable, than these new 
emerging markets could be curtailed until agreeable changes are instituted. This would result in 
additional expenses, delays, and reduced revenue.  
 
5 
 
The present report addresses these issues going forward, including selected performance 
enhancement possibilities. The projected requisite improvements in safety and reliability for 
UAS/ODM/PAV could be up to a factor of 1,000 to account for a 1,000 times more of them in the 
nation’s airspace projected going forward (millions versus thousands).  It is expected that the 
number of launches for reusable rockets in commercial space will increase because the cost 
associated with these launches will be reduced. However, a similar factor of 1,000 times 
improvement in launch reliability would be necessary to achieve the same safety and reliability 
as commercial aircraft on a per take off basis. Improvements of this magnitude, even factors of 
10 to 100, will require changes to current practices, including addressing accident causes at the 
system of systems level. 
 
The top reliability issues discussed in the next section include: human factors/errors, 
mechanical/equipment functionality, software/cyber threats, and environmental effects. The 
fundamental requirement for large improvements in safety and reliability is to accurately identify 
a range of inputs, including operational conditions over time, the equipment 
capabilities/functionality over time, the system of systems interactions, and whether or not these 
could lead to failure/loss of mission/overall functionality. This requires enlightened ideation of 
the potential risks. Of particular concern are the emergent properties of complex systems and 
their risk impacts. Overall, the current state of safety and reliability for the buildout of 
UAS/ODM/PAV and reusable rockets/resultant commercial space developments appear to be 
less than desired, possibly requiring orders of magnitude improvement. Safety is an emergent 
property of a system and complexity-based approaches are needed. 
Current Causes of Serious Safety and Reliability Issues for 
Aeronautics and Space 
  Causes of aircraft accidents/crashes: (Refs. 5) 
- 50% Pilot (human) error 
- 23% Equipment failure 
- 10% Environment/weather 
- 7 to10% Sabotage, terrorism, etc. 
- 7% Other human error 
   
  Causes of UAS and drone crashes: (Refs. 6-8) 
- 64% Equipment failure (e.g. controls, power/propulsion, communications) 
- 32% Human factors 
 
  Causes of rocket failures: (Ref. 9) 
- Engines/propulsion 
- Guidance and control 
- Human error 
- Software 
- Stage separation 
- Equipment (e.g. pumps, wiring, valves, aged parts, sensors, etc.) 
- System cascading failures 
- Design 
- Component overheating 
   
 Sampling of safety and reliability related issues in aerospace: (Refs.10-14) 
- Human error, major source of safety problems, crashes, even after many decades of 
R&D and technologies to reduce such (including controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)) 
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- Equipment failures, due to design, installation, operational employment, maintenance, 
aging, environmental effects, and tipping points for cascading system failures  
- Electron/photon related failures including cyber/software issues, EMP/space 
weather/radiation, jamming, failure of equipment essential for navigation, controls, 
sensing, propulsion, and communications, etc. 
- Inadequate margins, especially with regard to a cascading system of systems failures 
where reduced capability does not fail the parent part but adversely impacts in serious 
ways the functionalities/piece parts that the overall system depends on for robust 
performance. 
- Operation in extreme environments/in the presence of discrete extreme 
environmental/operational conditions (e.g. hurricanes/typhoons, bird strikes, extreme 
icing/rain/ dust) 
- Air Traffic Control (ATC) functionality, possibilities of collisions, reduced system capacity, 
as the current ATC system is largely human operated – human factors. 
- Bio becoming more virulent in space, (e.g. pathogenesis, corrosives). The human gut 
contains many microbes. 
- Potential impacts of reusability upon safety and reliability and certification for such 
- Human health issues (e.g. micro g, radiation, psychological, accidents, illness, etc.) 
- Collisions/impacts with debris, birds, other vehicles, and the ground 
- Wake vortex hazard, causing forces which cannot be controlled 
- Fuel starvation (due to human factors), lack of sufficient fuel 
- Costs/profits/schedule exigencies, “corner cutting” 
- Oxidative chemistry, causing equipment failure 
- Lightning and electrostatics, causing electronic failures, fires and explosions 
- Planetary and moon dust, abrasive, corrosive, oxidative 
- Fatigue and fracture, a prime design metric for much of aerospace equipage  
- Weather, storms, wind, space weather 
- Unknown unknowns, it is usually not possible to anticipate all combinational situations, 
conditions which will result in a reliability issue, we can become surprised reliability-wise 
- Inadequate analysis and testing, due usually to either cost or inadequate knowledge or 
study reliability writ large can be compromised 
- “Hazards”, hazards are major drivers for reliability design and engineering. As complete 
a set of especially combinational hazards is required. 
 Reliability and Safety Precepts/ hazards Approaches 
As noted, aerospace reliability and safety subsume a particularly broad arena including:  
operational, system of systems/cascading system failures, design (e.g. mechanical, electronic, 
cyber, sensor, communications, materials, controls), rare events, human errors, weather 
(including space weather), impacts/collisions (including with birds), costs, fatigue/fracture, health 
issues (e.g. radiation, micro g, dust), testing efficacy, etc. (Refs.15-19). 
 
Considering UAS/ODM systems and vehicles, thus far 64% of the increasing number of crashes 
are due to equipment failures such as propulsion/power, flight control, and communications. The 
rest are cited as human error and miscellaneous. This is quite different from extant commercial 
aviation, which has a sterling safety record and where only 23% of crashes are due to 
equipment failures versus equipment failure as the dominant cause for UAS/ODM. This 
difference strongly and obviously indicates the need for much better design and certification for 
UAS/ODM, which is thus far a class of vehicles and an overall business based upon 
inexpensive equipment. Market viability will likely dictate serious reductions in crash rates to 
account for the increase in the number of flying vehicles.  As this field moves forward, improved 
equipment and addressing the risk of human factors is needed to increase safety and reliability. 
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The inability over many decades to materially improve the accident rate of rocket launches is 
likely related to acceptable insurance rates and the historically high cost of space access and 
the lack of fiscally acceptable margins to work serious reliability improvements. The advent of 
reusable rockets and resulting inexpensive space will, among other major changes, enable 
more cost effective safety and reliability. 
 
A sampling of the components, arenas, and approaches for reliability/safety in aerospace that 
have been found or suggested to be useful include: (e.g. Refs.20-29) 
- Redundancy, backup systems , utilized on human rated systems especially 
- Certification, regulatory (IAF, American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) 
standards) 
- Inspection, including NDE, to identify emerging problems early for remediation 
- Integrated vehicle health management (IVHM), utilization of the increasing capability of 
sensors, actuators, computers and AI to identify safety issues early and enable 
corrections 
- Positive margins-to-fail-safe in the limit design approach, to build in “margins”, for 
inaccuracies in specification of design parameters and design details. 
- Digital twin, where the in service impacts on equipment are computed and compared 
with onboard sensors in real time for identification of emerging issues. 
- Manufacturing/installation care (level of workmanship including requisite training) 
- Repairability-to-self repair, related to larger margins. 
- Recovery approaches (e.g. Safe to Ditch, chutes, and morphing)  
- Emergency systems, including those that ensure human survivability 
- Electric propulsion  to obviate fuel fires 
- Reliability analysis including probabilistic methodologies informed by applicable big 
data/sensorization, uncertainty quantification 
- Preventive maintenance, a first order approach, guided by inspections, digital twin 
- Obviate single points of failure, as a design approach 
- Detailed operational mod sim, systems level, all disciplines, as an evolving alternative to 
physical testing 
- Resiliency/graceful degradation, fault tolerant systems 
- Commonality, for parts exchange, may enable reduced testing requirements 
- Reliability and safety a major design metric, along with the usual weight, cost, 
functionality major design issues. 
- Collision avoidance, the ever increasing sensor and computing capabilities is enabling 
major improvements in this. 
- Preflight checks, increasingly such checks will be accomplished by sensors/ robotics and 
AI. 
- Configuration management, as a major aid to ensure overall design and operational 
integrity. 
- Sources, nature of, checks for, and minimization of human error, since human error is a 
major source of safety/ issues/ accidents this is critical, and has proven to be very 
difficult. 
- Ability to override autonomous robotics systems, we are not yet at the technical state 
termed “trusted autonomy”, robotics and AI are designed largely by humans, and 
therefore human error possibilities exist. 
- Simplicity, lower part count (including via printing manufacturing) this has proven to be 
an effective safety approach, less parts , functions to fail 
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- Testing at all complexity levels from piece parts to system of systems, given the 
developing status of computation and knowledge of initial conditions in detail it is still 
important to conduct physical testing including at the operational, systems level.  
- Requirements specification and their validation, involves checking design assumptions 
and adequacy and predictions of operability, service life. 
- Materials and morphing materials/structure, ensuring that the materials utilized are the 
ones specified, are per the design. Morphing materials and some multifunctional 
materials are at an early stage of development, require detailed scrutiny 
- Zero defects manufacturing, a goal which is useful to increase overall safety awareness 
and care 
- Condition documentation, materials processing, construction, and in-service activities 
alter the condition of everything from materials to systems of systems, inspection, 
computation and associated documentation is a requirement for decisions regarding 
potential safety issues, reliability and remaining service life/ requisite repairs. 
- Flow control for weather proofing, there are many ways to control-to-obviate flow 
separation, the cause of many in atmosphere aerospace accidents, including flow 
separation associated with wind gusts and heavy precipitation and icing. 
- Operational impacts forecasting, projecting the various loads and conditions, including 
combinationally, a device will be subjected to operationally,  
- Crash proofing,  “flying while hurt, identify safe local landing areas and land versus crash 
- Continual study of previous reliability, safety experiences, issues, instantiations, crashes, 
knowledgeability, National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) data bases, NASA 
lessons learned, and the nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship efforts 
- Cost reductions to afford greater safety/reliability, The usual major metrics are Cost and 
functionality, it is often possible, if cost is reduced, to employ the savings, or a portion 
thereof, to improve safety. For human spaceflight, the major metrics are Cost and 
Safety. We are busily reducing cost via reusable rockets and ISRU , and thereby 
enabling safety improvements with respect to radiation, microg, reliability etc. 
 
The foremost approaches to reduce major causes of accidents includes Autonomy to largely 
obviate human factor issues. This can incite its own set of concerns which will have to be 
identified and addressed. Compared to human operations, the potential benefits of autonomous 
machines are many:  
- Exclusion of human operator error. For example, while machine errors exist in self-
driving cars, they are fewer than those committed by humans. 
- Autonomous machines are more durable and patient with far longer duty cycles not 
limited by human attention spans and need for sleep, nutrition, etc. 
- Potential for greater efficiency and speed 
- Possibilities for size reductions. Working spaces don’t have to be sized for humans and 
the conditions required to keep them healthy. 
- Increased knowledge. For example, IBM’s Watson super computer uses deep learning, 
which has proven successful in medicine because the machine knows far more than 
individual practitioners. 
- Reduced cost. Once operating and until repair is needed, most system costs involve 
paying people. The machines are famously taking the jobs. As a nascent example, self-
driving trucks are being developed and are expected to replace jobs previously occupied 
by truck drivers, which is a substantial employment segment. 
- New functionalities beyond those available from human capabilities. Due to superior 
sensor suites, machines can operate under conditions such as high radiation levels 
where humans cannot go safely. 
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  Additionally a major approach is to include sensors/instrumentation/artificial intelligence (AI)/on 
and off board, for all physical scales, to discover and monitor issues as they arise. To inform AI 
with regard to the need for corrective actions, requires machine ideation to intuit the presence 
and nature of unknown unknowns with regard to vehicle safety and reliability. Also, due to an 
absolute requirement for electronics for operations writ large including communications, and 
navigation/ controls, need electron/photon protection and functionality, protection from cyber-
attacks, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), and jamming. 
 
The current safety/reliability engineering practice includes the following set of tools/ approaches: 
- Hazard analysis 
- Fault tree analysis 
- Failure and damage modes and effects 
- Probabilistic risk assessment 
- Human error analysis 
- Simulation modeling 
- Experimentation 
- Root cause analysis 
- Degradation/life units 
- Plus: Lessons from history, expert opinions, best practices, ideation (especially for 
unknown unknowns and at the systems of systems levels), foresight, and vetting of new 
technological approaches in a system of systems context 
 
The rapidly developing UAS/ODM industry does not yet appear to heavily emphasize reliability 
and safety. Particular space-related concerns are rocket performance/reliability and the health 
concerns and related cost and schedule impacts associated with sending humans into space. 
These two frontier revolutionary and potentially very large industries are, as most nascent 
industries are, sensitive to costs across the board. Consideration of safety/reliability issues early 
on in the design cycle including at the systems level is perhaps a cogent approach to control 
costs associated with safety and reliability and ensure viability. 
 Enabling UAS/ODM   
(Ref. 1 and Refs. therein) 
Unmanned Air Systems (UAS)/On Demand Mobility (ODM) Issues 
The nearly concomitant development of IT capabilities such as navigation, computing, 
automatics-to-autonomy, ubiquitous sensors, and now electric propulsion and additive 
manufacturing, has spawned a rapidly growing market in electric aircraft drones and UAS for 
many applications and functionalities. These include: recreational, delivery, auto replacement, 
public services (e.g. fire, law enforcement, weather, mapping, search and rescue, inspection, 
disaster relief, and first responder), agriculture, national security, construction, and media and 
research. This in turn has instigated the rapidly developing efforts for what has been termed On 
Demand Mobility (ODM), including Urban Air Mobility (UAM). On Demand Mobility is initially 
piloted, but will eventually become autonomous UAS carrying human passengers.  
 
The metrics for these markets include: 
- Acquisition and operation costs 
- Safety and Reliability 
- Ease of use  
- Acoustics  
- Close proximity operations  
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- Ride quality  
- Emissions  
- Range and efficiency  
- Certification  
- All-weather operation to the extent possible or feasible 
- Crashproof 
 
These are in addition to the enabling autonomous operational and ATC systems to provide 
airspace access for the projected many millions of vehicles. 
 
The current ODM and UAM efforts are investigating VTOL with electric propulsion, distributed 
propulsion, and flow control as enablers. The literature is rife with large numbers of non helo 
VTOL devices and approaches with several-to-many lift fans.  Typical benefits include: lower 
noise, drag, vibration, cost, maintenance, and safety.  As the costs of renewables for electrical 
generation continue to drop and the batteries continue to improve, it is increasingly feasible to 
unload the lift fans for improved acoustics.  What has not yet been seriously considered for 
ODM/UAM or personal air vehicle (PAV), for VTOL operation is a stacked, stopped rotor for 
efficient cruise. For super short take-off and landing (STOL) operations there is the channel 
wing with circulation control, and for lower cruise speed STOL various flavors of autogyro.  
 
 Electric propulsion eliminates engine exhaust noise, enables distributed propulsion and flow 
control, and lighter engines, along with more of the many benefits of electrics. 
 
The Prospective Advantages of electric propulsion: 
- Regenerative energy recovery during descent and landing, analogous to regenerative 
automobile braking 
- Battery heat production, could be utilized for cabin heating, deicing, or regeneration  
- Higher altitude operation feasible, electric  Propulsion system not as sensitive to lower 
pressures  
- Reduced cooling drag, lower heat losses than gas turbine propulsion 
- Quieter, obviates exhaust noise 
- Reduced vibration, better ride quality 
- Fewer inspections, electric motors have far fewer parts and those parts have a very long 
life. 
- No engine flameouts or restarts, but could have battery operational issues. 
- No fuel explosions during crashes, although battery fires are possible 
- Power train efficiency greater than 90%, nominally twice or greater than Internal 
combustion and gas turbine engine chemically fueled propulsion 
- Much lower energy costs, the electric energy to charge the batteries is lower cost than 
aviation fuel 
- High reliability, per the operational history of electric motors 
- High efficiency over most of the power envelope 
- Up to six times motor power to weight, compared to combustion engines 
- Reduced maintenance, due to higher electric motor reliability and lower part count/ design 
- Far fewer parts 
- Less expensive 
- Higher torque 
- No vehicle emissions 
- Distributed, scalable propulsion, can position small electric motors for distributed 
propulsion, flow control, vehicle control, drag due to lift reduction 
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As stated, among the metrics for UAS/ODM etc. are reliability/safety and performance/costs. 
The expected increase in the number of these air vehicles going forward (three orders of 
magnitude greater), when applied to the current highly regulated and certified/developed 
commercial aircraft crash statistics strongly suggests a large-to-unacceptable number of 
crashes. Therefore, means should be ideated and developed to greatly improve an already 
extremely low commercial crash rate for application to UAS/ODM operations. The best case 
scenario would be to strive to make UAS/PAV vehicles crash proof. One approach to improve 
the cost/performance metrics for this class of air vehicle is to develop successful stopped rotor 
approaches which utilize the VTOL enabling rotor as the lifting wing for cruise in a stopped 
mode (Refs. 30). 
Toward Crash Proof UAS/ODM 
There are many occurrences which could cause a UAS/PAV crash. The current most prevalent 
cause of crashes with these devices are due to equipment failures (65% of crashes). This cause 
should be largely fixable with careful design/construction, operational care, and certification. The 
primary market issue for these air vehicles is cost minimization, and therefore cost increases 
associated with improving safety and reliability can be problematical. 
 
A second crash-producing issue is human errors of various types. This is the dominant cause of 
crashes for commercial aircraft. The increasing utilization of autonomy should reduce this cause 
of crashes. There is a plethora of other causes that lead to crashes including weather and 
collisions mid-air with the plane (e.g., birds). 
 
There are three obvious ways forward to foster crash proof behavior/capabilities: 
- Design/deploy iron birds: vehicles developed with the design precept of obviating the 
various experiential causes of crashes 
- Fly while hurt or keep flying. Not possible for all potential damage, issues, but is a design 
option which could incorporate self-healing aspects/materials/morphing and the associated 
AI. 
- Gently land in a local area that would minimize damage both on the ground and to the 
vehicle. This is perhaps the best approach which would incorporate piece parts of the other 
two approaches. This would involve: detection/selection on the fly of a suitable local 
landing site, means of flying/gliding to that site, and the means to land safely. 
 
Landing site selection for UAS, where flight is commonly over developed/populated areas, is not 
straightforward. Flattish rooftops with suitable structural strength are an obvious possibility, 
especially in cities. Otherwise, parking lots, low traffic roads, or open spaces/yards are 
possibilities. Obtaining the requisite data regarding such local possibilities can be via on board 
sensors or accessing what is evolving as a large swarm of low Earth orbit (LEO) Electro-optic 
satellites with the capability to stare anywhere 24/7/365 providing real time data on the local 
landscape. This is an evolving capability of the ongoing IT and AI revolutions. 
  
Flying or gliding to the selected emergency landing site could be facilitated by on 
board/deployable/flyable chutes or other means to provide vehicle control and lift. Inflatable 
auxiliary wings are also an option, as are autorotation blades. NASA currently has efforts with 
regard to landing safely locally termed safe-to-ditch and learn-to-fly. An obvious alternative or 
adjunctive approach is utilization of energy adsorptive vehicle designs and materials to both 
minimize damage to the vehicle and what it impacts. 
 
This mélange of safety, reliability, certification, crash proof, regulatory issues, maintenance, 
inspection, and design precepts is required to ensure viability of the evolving, eventually some 
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$1 T/elo new UAS/PAV aero markets. This is necessitated by their increasing numbers and 
where they fly and is a key issue regarding societal adoption. There are several additional 
arenas of operational concern including: acoustics, flight in urban canyons where vortical 
atmospheric wind and vehicle induced flows can occur, and of course a viable ATC system for 
many millions versus many thousands. 
UAS/ODM Requisite/Enabling ATC System 
The current limited capacity (thousands of aircraft) ATC system can be non-linear, i.e. smallish 
changes, occurrences producing large problems, issues has to always function, and is operated 
by humans with their associated latency and errors. Morphing the existing system to what will 
be required for many millions of aircraft is essentially a bridge too far. Ongoing changes to the 
existing system (e.g. FAA NextGen) are benign compared to what is required for the projected 
UAS/PAV numbers and are taking far too long. The enabling ATC system for UAS/PAV is the 
major issue impeding the development of these new markets. The vehicle and the 
safety/reliability issues pale in comparison with the ATC shortfalls. 
 
A suggested approach that is better, faster, cheaper, and is an alternative to evolving the 
existing ATC system is to develop a giant simulation around the current system, taking data 
from, but not inputting into or interacting with, the existing system. This simulation is then used 
to develop requisite software and associated hardware including the communications, 
navigation, software, sensors, collision avoidance, architectures, and AI.  All the piece parts and 
their system of systems which interact to create a new, wholly autonomous, minimal latency, 
and fail safe ATC system capable of handling millions of air vehicles. 
 
This simulation could then be demonstrated in the desert and once proven, becomes the new 
ATC system. The existing ATC system is then shut down and replaced by the simulation which 
is wholly autonomous. Oftentimes the best approach is to start over, especially when there is a 
plethora of new enabling technologies and vastly altered performance requirements. Those 
requirements include many orders of magnitude greater numbers of air vehicles and substantial 
reductions in latency. 
UAS /ODM Performance Enhancement Approach  
(Ref. 1 and Refs. therein) 
The major design metrics for UAS/ODM/PAV include: acoustics, emissions, reliability/safety, 
and sufficient range and efficiency with overall costs sufficiently low enough to engender a 
profit. Batteries and the renewable energy to charge them are evolving to where electric 
propulsion is feasible for increasing ranges, thereby seriously addressing emissions. In turn, 
electric propulsion proffers scalable distributed VTOL propulsion with numerous rotors/lift fans 
that address noise. 
 
In terms of design, concomitant with reliability/safety is range and efficiency. A lower 
weight/lower drag/efficient airframe reduces the requisite battery capability and increases range 
for a given battery SOA. There is a plethora of approaches to reduce weight and drag on 
airframes, both individual technologies and synergistically. Among these approaches is one that 
is particularly interesting: the stopped rotor.  
 
The stopped rotor approach utilizes a low noise, lightly loaded tip driven rotor (no tail rotor 
needed) to provide VTOL which, once in the air, is stopped and the rotor becomes the wing for 
cruising. The improved performance of this approach was recognized early on and has been 
worked since the 1950’s with two sizable efforts. The first was the X-wing in the 80’s, which 
used circulation control and never flew. The second was the Canard Rotor Wing program in the 
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early 2000’s, which after two crashes, was stopped. More recently the Navy and the Australians 
have been pursuing versions of the CRW approach. The major issue with the stopped rotor 
approach occurs when the rotor is stopped, which is the transition period. At that point one of 
the blades is facing the wrong way. Various solution spaces to address this issue have been 
tried. Two such approaches that appear to work are rapidly rotating the errant blade 180 
degrees and circulation control. As the blade stops, lift forces dynamically shift and the cruise 
propulsion system kicks in, creating worrisome aircraft stability and control issues. 
 
Some suggested ways forward that may be of interest to actualize the stopped rotor VTOL UAS 
approach include the following: 
- Utilize electric tip drives on the blade which obviates the need for tail rotors and reduces 
the blade drag due to lift. These can contribute to propulsion during cruise. 
- Thrust vectoring, AI, morphing surfaces, etc. for stability and control. 
- 180-degree rotation of the errant blade or morphing leading/trailing edge regions to alter 
the blade contour during rotor stoppage. One approach for morphing surfaces is using thin 
blades that project backward at the desired trailing edge to stretch a tailored elastic airfoil 
covering.  This forms a suitable trailing edge region contour that retracts into the airfoil in 
the desired leading edge region. Inflation and contour tailoring of these elastic coverings 
might be efficacious. 
- Strut-braced blades for greater span, lower drag due to lift, and to support the tip drives. 
UAS/PAV approaches to reduce weight and drag, reducing the requisite battery energy density, 
and increasing range include: 
- Flow control or designer fluid mechanics - Designer fluid mechanics subsumes a large 
number of flow control approaches and applications. These include: laminar flow control 
(LFC), mixing enhancement, and separated flow control for high lift, vortex control, 
turbulence control, and favorable wave interference for drag reduction. With the advent of 
the issue of battery weight for electric vehicles, LFC is especially under active 
consideration to reduce the requisite battery capacity. For turbulent drag reduction, the 
options include relaminarization and riblets. Electric propulsion proffers the possibility of 
straightforward distributed energy for flow separation control. 
- Aero/propulsion synergies – Conventional design practice in civilian aeronautics is to 
essentially separate the aerodynamics and the propulsion systems. Examples of aero-
propulsive synergies include: 
- Circulation control wings up to a factor of four increase in Cl (Lift Coefficient) 
- Boundary layer inlet: Ingesting lower momentum air for up to 10% to 15% propulsion 
efficiency increase. 
- Wing tip engines: To reduce drag due to lift. Wing strut and truss bracing are 
conducive to wing tip engine placement.  
- Thrust vectoring: Placing the engines at the rear of the fuselage and utilizing them for 
aero controls in lieu of the weight and drag of the empennage.  
- Hybrid laminar flow with leading edge suction utilized for high lift separation control.  
- Wave drag reduction ‐ Approaches include: Wing sweep, area ruling and reduced thickness, 
as well as wing twist, camber, and warp. Non-linear techniques include: Nose spikes, either 
physical or via forward projection of energy, gases, liquids, or particulates to extend effective 
body length. There is another class of approaches which utilize favorable shock 
interference. They utilize shock waves via reflection or interaction to create a favorable 
interference for body thrust, lift, or both. Parasol wings can provide on the order of a 20% 
improvement in overall lift-to-drag ratio at cruise. 
- Drag due to lift reduction - Elliptical loading, increased aspect ratio and span, lower lift 
coefficient, and reduced weight are the primary approaches. This has been addressed in 
many cases via creative overall aircraft configuration design (e.g. truss braced wings). The 
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use of non-planar lifting surfaces such as distributing the lift vertically through various 
approaches including upswept tips and multiple, vertically spaced wings, can provide sizable 
reductions. Also, devices can be inserted into the tip flow to produce or recover thrust and/or 
energy from local flow angularity. These include tip turbines for energy extraction, winglets, 
vortex diffuser vanes, tip sails, and other tip devices such as wing grids, spheroids, and c-
tips. Eliminating the physical wing tips can be accomplished either using ring wings or joined 
wings and tails. The truss-braced wing, as currently conceived, reduces DDL 75% by the 
simple expedience of doubling the span. This is enabled by the structural characteristics of 
the external truss, creating a new set of optimization parameters and approaches. 
- Landing gear weight reduction – Landing gear is 33% the weight of long-haul transport 
fuselages and 63% the weight of SST fuselages.  Therefore, they constitute a target rich 
environment for vehicle weight reduction.  Typically, gear includes large, heavy brakes for 
refused takeoff. Drag parachutes can be employed to handle refused takeoff, accruing 
sizable weight reductions.  The structure of the gear itself is typically sized for high impact 
landings.  Such loadings could probably be minimized in frequency and impact strength via 
autonomous operations, adjusting the lift system to the ground proximity and descent rate.  
- Revolutionary materials and structures - There are several extant, but low technology 
readiness level (TRL), approaches to significantly reducing the dry weight of aircraft via 
revolutionary materials and structures. By printing at the nano scale, technology is 
developing to produce superb material microstructure with far fewer dislocations and grain 
boundary problems. This greatly improves material performance. Another approach for ultra-
performance materials is to attempt to merge nanotubes into a contiguous structural 
material.  There are several approaches with estimates of performance improvements in the 
3X to 8X range.  There are also continuing efforts, with respect to composites, claiming 10X 
the performance of aluminum. Revolutionary structures approaches include externally truss-
braced wings (Refs. 89, 90). 
Enabling Commercial Deep Space  
(Ref. 2 and Refs. therein) 
  There are a myriad of reasons for humans to go into or operate in space: 
- Hedge the bets of the human species with regard to serious asteroid impact (e.g. 
becoming a multi-planet species), Colonization 
- Positional Earth utilities, a long-standing and thriving commercial space industry, GEO and 
below 
- National security 
- Science 
- Deep space commercialization 
- Space based resources 
 
Projections for commercial space include some 10,000 companies, 27,000 satellites and 
expansion beyond GEO (inner space) into outer space/deep space, with an overall evaluation of 
over $1T/yr. by 2040. 
 
There are two distinct commercial space activities: commercialization of government activities 
and where the customer is another commercial or private entity. Thus far the preponderance of 
commercial space activities has been near space, GEO and below positional Earth utilities, with 
increasing activity in commercialization of government functions. What has largely been missing 
is beyond GEO, outer/deep space, real commercial business. As a result of the technologies 
and approaches discussed herein, this activity is on a growth curve, initially involving space 
resource acquisition/utilization and moving toward colonization of places such as moon(s), 
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Mars, and eventually more exotic places such as the poles of Mercury, the upper atmosphere of 
Venus, and Titan.  
 
Some of the basic precepts of much of this increase in outer space commercialization include: 
reusability, in situ resource utilization (ISRU), resiliency, cost/return on investment (ROI), 
competition, and leveraging. The myriad extant space resources include: CO2 (e.g. on Mars), 
water (e.g. on the moon, Mars, and asteroids), minerals, solar energy, volatiles, microgravity, 
space, vacuum, and low temperature. The option spaces include: reusable or expendable, 
robotic and/or humans, solar/chemical/nuclear/positron power generation and resupply or ISRU. 
Commercial Space Planning/Possibilities 
- Major LEO constellations of small sats for high speed internet and electro-optics, expanding 
the number of satellites from the order of 1600 now to some 20,000 plus in 10 years. The 
electro-optic sats could enable staring anywhere 24/7/365. 
- Utilities for beyond GEO to service both public and private customers, including 
communications, energy/fuel, transportation, maintenance/repair, life support, etc. 
- Mining: Moon, Mars, and asteroids for anything commercially viable such as water, minerals, 
Helium-3, rare earths, volatiles, mass, etc. There are purportedly 1800 sizable near-Earth 
asteroids at lunar distances from Earth or less. 
- Entertainment including: virtual reality (VR), videos, and virtual presence to enable spending 
an evening exploring Mars from your living room 
- Collect anti-protons which are trapped in the Earths’ magnetosphere. Anti-protons are 
exceedingly expensive. In terms of energetics, they’re some 9 orders of magnitude greater 
than chemical due to 100% mass to energy conversion. 
- Asteroid defense, detection, and tracking, diversion of those deemed capable of causing 
grievous harm 
- Space solar power for planets, moons, and asteroids, in space, delivered via energy 
beaming (e.g. MW or lasers) 
- Space beach combing, the identification, collection, destruction, repurposing, and 
remanufacturing of space debris. Of particular interest is boosting the International Space 
Station (ISS) into a parking orbit and scavenging it for piece parts 
- Trash dump, putting trash in parking orbits for safe storage. This includes components of 
nuclear waste if it’s certified launch indestructible 
- Space manufacturing in orbit, in space, on other bodies, or enroute. Products identified thus 
far with major improvements when manufactured in micro g  include: pharma, fiber optics, 
ball bearings, light-emitting diode (LEDs), solar panels, organs, hearts, protein crystals, in 
addition to fuels, on planet/body human commercial space equipage, or anything that makes 
economic sense 
- Space hospitals if micro g or other in-space conditions prove to be efficacious for specific 
human ills 
- Space tourism/colonization of moon(s), Mars, Titan, poles of Mercury, upper atmosphere of 
Venus, and asteroids in space 
- Quantum technologies and quantum computing that utilize the quiet conditions in space 
including vacuum and low temperature to delay de-coherence, and stabilize quantum states 
- Positional Earth utilities, telecom, internet, navigation, weather, imagery/E-O, resource 
monitoring, etc. 
- Space weather forecasting. This has become increasingly important due to its impacts upon 
satellite operations as satellites proliferate and society relies more upon their functionality.  
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Commercial Deep Space Issues 
There are many serious reliability, safety, and performance issues for commercial deep space. 
These include the reliability of rockets vs. commercial aircraft that are orders of magnitude more 
reliable. This is particularly critical for space tourism and humans in space. Thus far the human 
space mortality issues have been connected with equipage and operational shortfalls. In 
addition to this are the space presence impacts upon human health including studies that show 
that biologics in space can become more virulent.  Humans can carry 1000 plus biologics in 
their intestines, begging the question of whether these benign biologics could morph into 
serious corrosives or pathogens over time in space.  
 
There are also issues with space dust. Moon and Mars dust are a health and operational 
problem for on-planet/moon activities. Controlling dust is a first order issue which needs to be 
researched and mitigation approaches designed into the mission. Dust on Mars is abrasive, 
electrostatic, magnetic, oxidative, and chemically reactive. It contains silicates, gypsum, arsenic, 
cadmium, and beryllium, as well as perchlorates, which affect the thyroid. There is concern that 
the dust could become much more corrosive, a greater problem once inside habitats at their 
higher pressure, temperature, water and oxygen content. Then there is space debris, becoming 
ever more serious an issue, with thus far no cogent extant solution spaces.  
 
An additional major concern/ current shortfall for commercial deep space is cost/ROI/profit. 
Human Health Issues in Space (Ref. 3 and Refs. therein) 
   The following is a worrisome and incomplete list of human health issues and concerns for 
humans in space: The basic differences in health-related parameters between the ISS in 
LEO and the missions to and from the moon and Mars include a longer time frame. For 
example, currently it takes 3-years roundtrip using expendable rockets versus the six 
months tour on ISS. Spacecraft are also exposed to microgravity and full galactic cosmic ray 
(GCR) versus only 45% on ISS due to the effects on radiation of the Earth’s magnetic field.  
Attendant increased time-related reliability, safety, psychological issues and other health 
concerns also increase for missions to and from the moon and Mars. The detailed nature of 
the potential clinical health impacts for humans at Mars and their potential synergistic effects 
are largely unknown. Where the impacts are known, the effects appear to scale in severity 
with the exposed time in space. The potential effects of the .38g on Mars or the 1/6th g on 
the moon are also unknown, but partial gravity is expected to relax the issues experienced 
on ISS during microgravity. The many and various mitigation approaches employed thus far 
are mainly directed at trying to establish conditions closer to those on Earth, conditions 
which resulted in current human physiology.  
 
Identified Unmitigated Human Health Issues in Space 
- Mars dust contains perchlorates about 10,000 times higher than Earth levels. They are 
small, sharp, and highly oxidative particles known to impact the thyroid and respiratory and 
cardio-pulmonary systems. 
- Pathogens, or in-space biologics, that have been observed to become more virulent in 
combination with immune system degradation. Other immune systems impacts are expected 
from weakened t-cell function and immune system weakness due to the combination of 
radiation, microgravity, and psychological issues 
- Microgravity allows fluid shifts that cause: eye/vision changes that blur vision upon abrupt 
movement; motion sickness that affects balance and appetite and causes dizziness and 
stuffiness; DNA damage such as double strand breaks, chromosome aberrations/mutations, 
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attenuated repair process; down regulation of P53; weakened t-cells; 1% per month bone 
mineral loss (especially calcium) and early onset osteoporosis and kidney stone propensity; 
muscle atrophy up to 20% loss in 5-11 days; skin irritation; cardio-vascular deconditioning; 
cardio arrhythmia; and heart degeneration including 30% to 50% decrease in maximal O2 
uptake due to blood cell and capillary altered interactions and blood volume loss; orthostatic 
hypotension and low blood pressure; neurologic, brain, cerebrovascular, and 
neurovestibular changes as well as reduced release of neuro-transmitters; effects on spinal 
fluid; sensory changes and dysfunction; increased homocysteine; liver damage including 
long term scarring and non-alcoholic fatty liver disease; and finally fibrosis 
- Space radiation present both in space and on planet/body causes: radiation sickness, 
degenerative tissue effects, DNA damage, DNA repair process alterations, and oxidative 
DNA damage, as well as immune system degradation.  This includes: significant reduced 
ability to produce blood cells, anemia, carcinogenesis including leukemia, tissue 
degeneration, respiratory effects, cataracts, heart, cardiovascular, and digestive system 
impacts, as well as neurologic effects, central nervous system and cognitive impairment, 
Alzheimer’s (white matter hyperintensities of the brain) reduced length and area of 
dendrites, performance decrements and memory deficits, loss of awareness, focus, and 
cognition. A recent study indicates that GCR causes collateral tissue damage to adjacent 
cells (called bystander cell damage from heavy nuclei) and could increase the cancer risk by 
some factor. 
- Psychiatric effects due to a combination of physiological impacts already noted plus 
distance from Earth, diet changes, sleep deprivation, and close proximity to other crew 
members 
- Toxic chemical exposure from spacecraft components  
- Reliability/life support system failures, spacecraft propulsion, and other mechanical failures 
including sensors and human errors 
- The usual space conditions of cold and vacuum which at conditions in space outside a 
habitat or a space suit are deadly 
- Then there are the potential synergistic effects of all of these combined, which are at this 
point a work in progress. Thus far, only the Apollo crews have been subjected to micro g 
and full GCR, but for only a few days. As stated, these mostly tend to become more onerous 
with time in space, as recently evidenced by Scott Kelly’s comments with respect to changes 
to his health as a result of his nearly one year in space on the ISS versus the usual 6 
months tour in space.  
 
Thus far, engineering system failures have been the major cause of human death in spaceflight. 
Another concern is radiation that causes a mutagen in a pathogen when the immune system is 
compromised and the medication on board does not work because the human metabolism has 
shifted. It is the potential interaction of factors that nobody has considered which puts human 
health in unknown danger while in space. Many of the risks associated with long duration space 
travel are not fully understood.  
Mitigation Approaches for Human-Mars Health Issues 
As stated above, NASA is developing and proving out a robust suite of micro-g 
countermeasures including exercise, which thus far mitigates many of these microgravity 
effects. Some experts have written that many to most of these microgravity effects are simply 
the body adapting to microgravity, are mostly reversible, and in the microgravity environment, 
such changes are not necessarily adverse. However, the widely held opinion is the less time 
spent in microgravity the better. 
 
Here is a short list of mitigation approaches being considered for human-Mars health issues: 
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- Exercise places loads upon muscles and bones to counteract the microgravity effects 
mentioned above. This is proving to be increasingly efficacious per ISS experiences. While 
mitigating the musculature and skeletal issues, exercise also helps maintain the immune 
system and cardiovascular fitness. There are, however, some effects of microgravity that 
exercise may not be as effective in mitigating including impacts upon vision. 
- Nutritional and dietary supplements plus pharmaceuticals, anti-oxidants, and similar 
regimens are also proving to be efficacious and are a work in progress. Biological 
countermeasure research is upbeat with respect to several substances, but this research is 
in its early days. Although it’s still too early to determine implementation, there are long-term 
possibilities for the future of genomics and synthetic biology to solve catastrophic diseases 
and perhaps someday space harden humans. 
- Conventional space radiation protection shielding using low molecular weight materials 
required for high atomic number (Z) radiation, requires a sizable to large amount of 
additional spacecraft weight and cost. Reduced LEO access costs, such as proffered by 
reusable rockets (up to a factor of 14 less cost to LEO), would be enabling. Materials and 
their arrangements as components of spacecraft architecture are a contributor to radiation 
protection, but additional measures are also required. Potential radiation protection 
approaches include: active approaches using magnetics and electrostatics including nano-
forest electrostatic concepts to reduce the requisite gap voltages and magnetics moved 
farther away from the capsule/in-space habitats, and potentially mini-magnetosphere, and 
plasma.  A reusable radiation protection overcoat that remains in orbit may be the better 
approach for minimizing MLEO and dose over time.  Then there is the possibility of 
redirecting highly energetic particle radiation (GCR) using crystals as is common practice in 
accelerator science. 
-  Fast transits allow for much shorter round-trip durations to reduce human exposure time to 
space conditions that affect human health. NASA has a new nuclear battery approach study 
that proffers powering the Variable Specific Impulse Magnetoplasma Rocket (VASIMR) and 
results in a 200-day round trip to Mars versus the usual roundtrip of 3 years. This shorter trip 
time could largely solve many of the health issues by increasing the relevance of 200-day 
ISS conditions while reducing the requisite MLEO [mass in low earth orbit] necessary for 
long-duration missions lasting 3 or more years. Fast transits are also likely to show 
reductions in cost just like that experienced by reusable rockets. Given “the continuing 
reductions in costs of space access fast transits may be affordable via chemical propulsion. 
- Artificial gravity (AG), created by rotating portions of the in-space habitat, is thought to be 
more efficacious than exercise in resolving some health issues associated with microgravity. 
However, AG concepts pose additional requirements on the in-space architecture generally 
involving various rotational components.  
- Space flight during solar maximum, during which time GCR levels are lower and therefore 
have reduced negative health impact 
- Applying partial vacuum to lower body parts to pull fluid away from the head, eyes, and 
upper body. This mimics the effects of gravity upon body fluid distribution. 
- Hypnosis to induce sleep for alleviating many issues related to sleeplessness 
- Electrical stimulation and vibrating platforms for bones/muscles to induce additional 
circulation. 
- Improved virtual and robotic on-spacecraft medical care including prevention, diagnosis, 
treatment, and surgery including robotic surgery. 
Space Debris (Ref. 4 and Refs therein) 
Since the late 1950s, we have launched around 6600 satellites, approximately 1130 of which are 
still operational. However, many of the non-operational satellites are still in space. There have 
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been approximately 240 explosions in space and many collisions, two of which were major events. 
All of this has contributed to the current space debris issue.  
 
The amount of this space debris is daunting. Estimates indicate about 6000 tons, with some 
5000 pieces greater than 1 meter in size, 22,000 greater than 10 cm, 700,000 greater than 1 
cm, and 150,000,000 bits greater than 1 mm. Even the smaller pieces, given the closure 
speeds, can create worrisome effects upon impact. As an example, an impact speed of 12 
km/sec has approximately 10 times the energy density of dynamite. A quote from a 2011 
National Research Council report entitled Limiting Future Collision Risk to Spacecraft, 
summarizes that year’s outlook, which is becoming ever more serious: “When a handful of 
reasonable assumptions are used in NASA’s models, scenarios are uncovered that conclude 
that the current orbital debris environment has already reached a ‘tipping point,’ meaning the 
amount of debris currently in orbit–in terms of the population of large debris objects, as well as 
overall mass of debris in orbit–has reached a threshold where it will continually collide with itself, 
further increasing the population of orbital debris.” 
 
The increase in orbital debris will lead to corresponding increases in spacecraft failures, which 
will only result in more debris in orbit. The increase thus far has been most rapid in LEO, with 
GEO potentially suffering the same fate, although over a much longer time period. The exact 
timing and pace of this exponential growth are uncertain, but the serious implications of such a 
scenario require careful attention because of the strategic and commercial importance of U.S. 
space operations. In the literature, this cascading of collisions producing ever more debris until 
the space region is essentially unusable is termed the Kessler Effect. Given the increasing 
worldwide reliance upon space assets, our positional Earth utilities have made space debris an 
increasingly serious problem. 
 
Overall, current solution spaces include  
- Detect/ track and avoid. 
- Protect from impact [e.g. Whipple shields for small debris, install critical/sensitive 
portions in the interior of the spacecraft, or harden the design so it can take the hit]. This 
approach may not work for larger debris, or may be too expensive. Some external critical 
parts, such as solar panels and antennas, are obvious issues when considering 
protection under this latter solution. 
- Self-remove: designing objects that deorbit at the end of their life, extend drag-producing 
devices, move to parking orbits, or utilize the higher drag during solar maximum. 
 
Space Reliability/Safety Status and Prospective Ways Forward  
(Refs. 33, 34) 
The current status of space reliability and safety is typified by the loss rate of space access which 
include: accidents, crashes and explosions. Issues like these occur the order of once every 100 
launches, a rate of 1% or greater. The launch of the Space Shuttles experienced a smaller number 
of flights between accidents, while space tourism and the commercial space business probably 
require a number far larger. The current state of affairs of space reliability and safety aspirations 
is the updated NASA NPR 8705.2c, which includes the human rating requirements for space 
systems. This sets forth the approaches and procedures for LOC [loss of crew] greater than 500 
launches and descents, and greater than 270 for launch, descent, and in-space activities. The 
maximum g loading is three. Also included are rescue and emergency systems. The usual space 
structural design metric for margin is 20% above maximum loads.  A major space access 
company is designing with 40% to enable reusability and human rating. They are also employing 
continual upgrades to improve reliability. 
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What is especially efficacious for space access rocket reliability/safety in the future are the cost 
reductions from use of reusable rockets, along with considerable further cost reductions from 
frontier materials/dry weight reductions/greater payload fraction, and use of AI/robotics for end-
to-end operations in lieu of human labor. These cost reductions should enable major 
improvements in reliability and safety to be afforded, developed, and deployed. The issue is 
determining the level of launch reliability and safety required by the developing commercial deep 
space businesses. The current 1% or greater loss rate can, and should be, much improved. There 
are current committees sponsored by the IAF and ASTM to exchange information and develop 
safety/reliability standards, respectively, with regard to commercial space flight. As stated, there 
is evidently not yet an agreed upon LOC criteria, nor are there other criteria concerning what is 
safe enough for commercial space. These are needed to guide further ideation and research and 
development (R&D) for improving such. 
 
Obvious major safety improvement opportunities include: 
- Even greater structural factors of safety 
- Reduced uncertainty writ large, from material characterization and operational conditions to 
systems of systems. 
- Back-up, fail safe, and safe systems 
- Extensive sensor suites and IVHM 
- Emergency and recovery systems 
- AI monitoring/solution generation and execution 
- Systems of systems/operational aspects/potential hazards  
- Tipping point identification 
Potential Mission Analogs for Practical Approaches to Verification of 
Safety and Reliability 
Ways forward and suggested approaches must be verified.  Assumptions made in simulations 
and analysis must be validated.  This means testing.  But, how and where?  NASA uses “in a 
relevant environment” and “mission operational environment” with respect to technology 
maturation (Technology Readiness Level). NASA adopts a verification philosophy of “Test Like 
You Fly” to guide experimental verification of system performance and revealing unforeseen 
failure modes (Refs.35, 36). All these point to the need for representative testing analogs for 
addressing the conditions expected in the intended mission uses. 
 
As mentioned previously, the missions discussed herein are far more stressing with regard to 
safety and reliability than current missions.  Commercial airline flight reliability numbers will not 
be sufficient for the expected UAS markets. Astronauts staying on the ISS do not fully represent 
the many other conditions of radiation and the combinations of long duration exposure to many 
health degrading environmental factors on the human body in deep space. The emergence of 
inexpensive space access should greatly increase space flight rates. 
Test Like You Fly 
History has demonstrated the limitations of mathematical formulas alone to yield sufficient 
designs.  At times, overly confident and premature use of aerospace systems led to costly 
recognition of unknown unknowns, resulting in construction of new ground-based facilities 
eventually yielding far superior designs due to a more thorough understanding of vehicle behavior 
in relevant environments.   
 
What is different today is that continued advancements in technologies allow for rapid prototyping, 
quicker understanding of cause and effects, and faster turnaround on next generation designs.  
Industry demonstrated the success of this process by offering launch vehicles at far less cost than 
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its competition due to efficiencies in the design that allowed for reusability.  This development 
process can be applied to other aerospace systems such as those needed for the two aerospace 
revolutions mentioned herein. 
 
What is not different is the human element within both aerospace revolutions.  Humans are fragile 
passengers even if they do not hold the controls of the vehicle.  For the case of the UAS/PAV, 
the humans are very much like those who enjoy air travel today.  The substitution of the human 
pilot by a computer does not change the range of environmental conditions that the passengers 
experience.  For the case of deep space, the environment will be quite different than any previous 
human spaceflight experiences and certainly quite different than air travel.   
 
As mentioned above, the ISS does not offer a true representation of deep space conditions.  A 
“Test Like You Fly” philosophy will drive demand on new testing facilities beyond LEO, where 
environments are far more relevant to deep space conditions.  The lunar surface provides a more 
suitable analog for living conditions on Mars than does the ISS.  Like the spacecraft, humans will 
train in the Mars analog in hopes of reducing the number of unknown unknowns currently 
associated with human space flight beyond LEO.   
 
As in the early days of human space flight, ground and flight testing will lead to new applications 
of empirical data to improve spacecraft designs and keep the crew safe.  Government agencies 
will leverage resources for advancing U.S. presence beyond LEO to protect commercial 
investments there.  Advances in bioastronautics and aerospace medicine may play a major role, 
along with improvements in GCR shielding and artificial gravity, to extend the number of days that 
crew may stay beyond LEO, yielding a redundant pathway towards improved reliability and 
mission success.   
 
Like mean time between failures (MTBF) tracked for spacecraft systems, each crew will be 
measured for exposure levels to GCR and microgravity and placed in remediation protocols 
before exceeding lifetime proxy limits.  Remediation protocols may require in-space virtual doctors 
and real medical facilities rather than returning the astronaut to Earth-based facilities.   
 
The lifetime proxy limits, possibly in the form of deep space exposure tables, will be established 
by ongoing experiences in space, including missions at Mars analog field stations such as on the 
lunar surface or in lunar orbit.  As more is learned about the combinational effects, the exposure 
limits will be adjusted and deep space exposure tables updated, much like the changes over time 
to the scuba dive tables. It is only by “Test Like You Fly” that confidence in system reliability, 
safety, and performance can be truly realized. 
Certification Strategy Built on Phased Pieces of Increasing 
Complexity 
Human operations in space typically cost the order of 500 to 1000 times more than robotic, 
autonomous ones and must include sizable, expensive additional systems to keep humans alive 
and healthy. Therefore, for both financial and sociological sake (i.e. the societal impacts of loss 
of crew), it is essential that extensive efforts be undertaken to increase the safety and reliability 
requirements associated with humans in space. 
 
The question is, of course, what safety level is required for humans in space and for what purpose. 
Explorers presumably are more risk tolerant than space tourists. That understanding may be the 
key goal to any certification process for both the aeronautics and space sides requiring orders of 
magnitude in improvements in safety. 
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It is recognized that all potential sources of failures, or their expected order of occurrence based 
on any likelihood correlated to statistics mentioned above, cannot be accounted for up front in the 
system designs.  So, just as trust must be earned, so too will reliability and therefore safety. 
 
Starting with the system complexity that is most familiar and understood, then adding in more 
features as lessons are learned during experiments at risk postures that do not expose the human 
element to unreasonable risk, seems the most prudent strategy.  Below are some principals that 
may define that strategy: 
- Due to the developing state of numerical and analytical testing approaches, and the ever-
present possibilities of real-world unknown unknowns, physical testing should be the favored 
gold standard approach, in as complete a representation of the final system design and set of 
environmental and performance conditions as feasible. 
- Serious literature studies and historical data should be employed to inform problem and 
solution spaces and their performance expectations. 
- Producing orders of magnitude in improvements in safety and reliability will require 
consideration, evaluation, and testing of effects, conditions that are usually, hitherto been 
treated as secondary and noncritical or unimportant. Such improvements constitute new 
frontiers. 
- Most serious issues are cascading failures and involve individually subcritical interactions or 
changes in multiple subsystems. This requires extensive testing of the final configuration and 
the system of systems to obtain definitive results. 
- Individual technologies for specific issues should be tested piecemeal initially before 
incorporation. 
- Analogues, such as those discussed previously, are usually used to gain insight and 
document trends, as well as to verify, or not, expectations. 
 
One thing is clear.  No matter the analogs created along the route toward certification, the threat 
of loss of life will be an uppermost consideration. Hence, planning and budgeting play key roles.  
Both will change with political environments and potential races to be first.  Much will be learned.  
The question is at what expense.   
Concluding Remarks 
We are in the midst of simultaneous IT, bio, nano, quantum, and energetics technology 
revolutions. These technologies, when applied to aerospace, are enabling huge new markets, 
including UAS, the long sought-after PAV, and a plethora of deep space commercial activities. 
These markets are potentially very major, but currently nascent, and their equipage is developing 
in real time. They face serious safety and performance issues which include: crash statistics for 
less than the usual commercial aircraft statistics, necessitated by the expected huge numbers of 
vehicles, and the enabling ATC system for such numbers of aircraft. Issues for commercial deep 
space include: the increasing space debris, humans-in-space health issues, and space access 
rocket reliability. High levels of reliability and safety, and the enabling system performance to pay 
for them, are forward work. The narrative herein discusses the nature of these issues and posits 
prospective cogent solution spaces. 
 
Suggested approaches for orders of magnitude increases in safety and reliability include: 
- Greatly enhanced discovery, collection, and documentation of all hazards going into the 
design cycle  including combinational, cascading failure causes/risks (mechanical, software, 
environmental, human factors, including extreme cases) 
- Autonomy to largely obviate human factors risks, which are usually the most prevalent cause 
of serious issues. This requires superb trusted autonomy technology. 
- Ubiquitous instrumentation/data analytics for intuition of developing issues to enable repair 
and obviation 
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- Fail-safe design including  hardware and software 
- Greater margins/damage tolerance and resiliency 
- Analysis/prevention of cascading system failures 
Overall – safety and reliability as a prime metric from materials, design through manufacturing, 
operations, maintenance, monitoring, and throughout the life cycle at the systems of systems 
level. 
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